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Civilisational Crisis
Ferenc Miszlivetz and Mary Kaldor
The Rise of the New Nationalism
George Orwell remarked, in 1945, on the prevalence of
nationalism among the English intelligentsia. By
nationalism, he did not necessarily mean attachment
to the nation-state. Rather he was referring to
the habit of assuming that human beings can be
classified like insects and that whole blocks of
millions or tens of millions of people can be
confidently labelled 'good' or 'bad' . . . (and) the
habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or
other unit, and placing it beyond good and evil and
recognising no other duty than that of advancing
its interests [Orwell 1970:411].
Nationalists, according to Orwell, often lose touch
with reality; supporters of Hitler in the l930s were
apparently unaware of the existence of Dachau and
Buchenwald while Russophiles could not admit the
existence of Soviet concentration camps.
Some nationalists are not far from schizophrenia,
living quite happily amid dreams of power and
èonquest with the physical world . . . The point is
that as soon as fear, hatred, jealousy and power
worship are involved, the sense of reality becomes
unhinged. And, as I have pointed out already, the
sense of right and wrong becomes unhinged also.
There is no crime, absolutely none, that cannot be
condoned whcn 'our' side commits it.
[Orwell 1970:421, 430]
Orwell could not explain the reasons for this
phenomenon. He thought it was probably 'a distorted
reflection of the frightful battles actually happening in
the external world', and that it was made possible by
the breakdown of prevailing beliefs.
Today, we are witnessing the re-emergence of
nationalist passion. During the Falklands war, many
people were surprised by the hidden depths of British
jingoism. Class hatreds, religious bigotry, racist
violence, ideological struggle all are apparently
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sharpening. But what is of deepest concern is the
development of the Cold War. The new right in the
United States will condone death squads in El
Salvador or ideas of 'limited' nuclear war or indeed
ant' action that is committed in the name of anti-
communism. A similar emotion, characterised as anti-
imperialism or opposition to West German revanchism
is expressed by some elements within the Soviet state.
And these attitudes are often mirrored in the attitudes
of opposition groups in both East and West. Some of
those on the Western left who oppose American
nuclear weapons and interventionism in the Third
World are ready to condone the Soviet arms build-up
or intervention in Afghanistan as 'defensive' and to
regard violations of human rights as 'a lesser evil'. By
the same token, those who support the struggle for
civil liberties in Eastern Europe often seem unaware of
what is going on in places like Turkey or Central
America.
Orwell pointed out the hideous atrocities that are
unleashed by nationalism. The atrocity that could be
unleashed by the New Cold War is global destruction.
This is the essence of what we call the Civilisational
Crisis.
Nuclear and microelectronic technologies in the last
decades have entered into total conflict with
traditional geographical and political units and
concepts. Having produced a technology which, for
the first time in history, can affect the whole planet and
probably beyond, humankind is unable to use its own
creation for social and human need. In his article 'Can
we survive technology?' (published in 1955) John von
Neumann called this phenomenon the maturing crisis
of technology. Von Neumann predicted that by l980s
this crisis would develop far beyond all earlier patterns
of crisis. Yet, at the very moment when this new crisis
should open up new avenues of political thinking, the
attachment to traditional concepts, i.e. nationalism, is
growing. The civilisational crisis thus includes the
ever-growing tensions and discrepancies between
material technology and, to use a metaphor, social
technology, by which we mean running and organising
societies; in short, the reproduction of social relations.
It is in the realm of social relations that the solution to
the crisis must be sought. It cannot be solved by
prohibiting this or that particularly dangerous form of
technology. The solution can only come, in the first
instance, from a recognition of humanity as a single
unitary concept. Humanity cannot be divided into
hostile units associated with different variants of
nationalism. This does not mean that nation states
must be eliminated or that world government must be
introduced or that, indeed, forms of social organisation
which require smaller sub-global units are to be
excluded. Rather it means that, however humanity
divides itself for the purpose of social and political
organisation, this division should not obliterate the
common bond of humanity. And that no sub-global
unit should claim omnipotence. In short, it should not
entail nationalism - the labelling of groups of people
as 'good' or 'bad' and it should not entail war.
The original meaning of the word 'crisis' is 'decision'.
In order to understand the opportunities for several
possible decisions, we need to trace the background
and possible alternatives to the New Cold War.
Crisis of Newtonian Rationalism
One of the most basic elements of the ideological
sphere of the world system is what Immanual
Wallerstein and others have identified as Newtonian
Rationalism [see Wallerstein 1982]. Our crisis at its
most basic is a crisis of this rationalism which
represents the underlying paradigm of our knowledge.
Because it is so deeply rooted in our way of thinking
and so much a part of our mental processes, it is not
perhaps easy to identify. We are talking about the
basic axioms and mental language which structure and
determine more than we realise our so-called
'scientific' view of the world. This scientific paradigm
was developed in the form of universal laws and
systematised in the 17th century by thinkers like
Descartes, Locke and Newton.
Originally it was the physical sciences which justified
and elaborated universalism. But the social sciences
invented in the 18th century and after were deeply
influenced by this doctrine and followed the lead of the
physical sciences. In the name of Nature, Reason and
the all-embracing 'scientific method', social sciences
claimed universalism.
Universalism means two things, that:
i) the same scientific method, concepts and axioms
- the universal laws - can explain the whole universe;
ii) our globe is a mechanical summation of many
separate units, which is precisely why these methods
are applicable to all.
The civilisational crisis of today has called this
paradigm itself in question. Our purpose here is to
highlight that aspect of the paradigm which is most
critical to world peace; namely the contradictory
character of the unit of analysis.
Classical physics conceived of units as having
separateness prior to interaction. Each unit evolves
separately as if it were alone in the world. Parallel to
this construct, we in the social sciences tend to
consider our basic unit of analysis the nation-state.
This unit, it is true, can become larger like the EEC,
NATO or the Warsaw Pact as opposed to Russia, the
llapsburg Empire or Great Britain, but it is still
basically the separateness which dominates our
analysis. The nation-state, in most social science
thinking, is the independent variable.
Of course in modern physics and in some social science
theories, e.g. Structuralism or Marxism, the notion of
a mechanical summation of separate parts has given
way to a systemic approach in which the units of
analysis are only defined in relation to other units.
Nevertheless, by their nature such systemic approaches
are also exclusive. i.e. based on partial views of the
world, and also are based on the claim to universalism.
The problem can be illustrated in the Marxist
treatment of the state which, strictly speaking, stands
outside the Marxist system of thought. Hence, it is
generally treated as subordinate to a particular class
interest. This gives rise to étatism, in the sence that the
state becomes an independent variable in the hands of
progressive forces.
The nation-state, in orthodox social science thinking,
is separated not just from other nation states but also
from civil society. The very categories of social science
thinking express this separateness; the political, the
realm of state activity, is clearly separated from the
economic or the sociological. Within the boundaries
of the nation, the state, it is assumed, has absolute
control, even if that control is to be exercised in order
to minimise state intervention, i.e. to guarantee free
markets. If social science theory comes up with
prescriptions for change, it is assumed that these
prescriptions can be carried out by the state. The
political problem, and this is also true for orthodox
Marxist thinking for reasons described above, is how
to capture state power. The implication of this kind of
thinking is that limitations on state power are imposed
externally by other nation-states. A Western example
is the Thatcherite portrayal of the Russian enemy,
which is transposed to the 'enemy within' every
domestic confrontation. An Eastern example is the
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Soviet view that the shortcomings of socialism can
entirely be attributed to Western aggression and
Western-imposed isolation. Herein lies the danger of
war when the limits to state power are experienced.
Contradictions of the Inter-State System
The rise of the modern nation-state and the parallel
notion of distinct nations - unique organisms with
national character, national history and even national
ideals - was associated with the rise of capitalism. Of
course, the evolution of the nation-state went through
distinct historical phases.
The early nation was the preserve of a minority of the
population whose politico-economic standing basically
determined the shape of the nation. This changed with
the French Revolution. After the Third Estate
proclaimed itself as a National Assembly, the nation
comprised everybody in principle. Eventually this new
nation-state became the standard model of 19th
century Europe. The well-known characteristics of
this model included patriotism, which became a
political creed; secularisation; concepts of equal
citizenship, state bureaucracies and national armies;
national histories, the myth of common origin and so
on. But the contradictions of this structure were
evident very early. Self-determination was coupled
with the concept of sovereignty. And sovereignty did
not always mean the right of every ethnic minority or
social class to self-determination. (This 19th century
national contradiction is alive even today - Ireland,
the Basque question, Hungary, Rumania etc.) Nation-
states remained ethnically multinational and socially
divided.
Crucial here is the fact that nation-states are not
primordial entities, they are political constructions of
a specific phase of history. The potential separatism of
minorities in these nations was paralleled by the
potential separatism of classes. If one focuses on this
dual potential separatism of ethnicities and classes,
one can see why the nation-state needs an ideology of
'nationalism' which cements societies which are full of
divisions. This ideology attempts assimilation and
subordination of its social components, be they classes
or ethnicities. Nationalism became an ideology of
homogenisation around a dominant cultural code.
But as always the question is, who really benefits from
this homogenisation? We all need identity, but which
identity and for what? National self-determination
never escapes the problem formulated by Ivor
Jennings criticising the Wilsonian doctrine: 'On the
surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide! It
was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot
decide until somebody decides who are the people'.
The contradiction of self-determination with
sovereignty is aggravated when sovereignty becomes
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identical with territorial integrity, which, pushed to its
limits, abuses the identification of the people with the
state. Indeed, this led to rearranging the map of
Europe after the First World War.
This reveals the basic ambiguity of nationalism, this
political force, this modern Janus, to use Michael
Lowy's term. In early capitalism, it was used to oppose
absolutism; later it became a tool of imperial
competition and expansionism. With the breakdown
of the European inter-state system in the 1920s and
1930s, nationalism became a cover for protectionism,
exciusivism and Fascism - at its ugliest, racist
Nazism.
The post-war inter-state system appeared, initially, to
have decisively defeated the European nationalisms of
the 19th century that justified imperialism and led to
the world wars of the 20th century. In fact, however,
the new inter-state system has given birth to new forms
of nationalism in the Orwellian sense, with even more
sinister consequences. What were the new dimensions
of the post-war inter-state system?
The major reaction to Western capitalism i.e.
communism, achieved its biggest successes in alliance
with nationalism. In other words, the major
civilisational response to world capitalism could not
emancipate itself from the nation-state paradigm of
the old civilisation. On the contrary, communism
became identified with statism, so much so that the
nation-state seemed to embrace the whole of civil
society. The doctrine of 'socialism in one country'
reflects the need to retain the nation-state paradigm
both domestically and externally.
The process of decolonisation was translated
into a national liberation struggle - nationalism in
the Third WOrld. But the new nation-states in the
Third World were modelled on pre-existing Western
states. Former antagonists were grouped, often
arbitrarily, into a nation, making future internal strife
a certainty, for example, Uganda, Ethiopia, Pakistan,
Palestine, etc. Moreover, the reproduction of Western
state relations facilitated Western penetration and
gave rise to new forms of neocolonialism which often
exacerbated internal divisions.
The transnationalisation of the global economy
undermined the power of the traditional nation-state.
The phenomenal growth of trade, transfers of capital
and technology, and migration of labour required
larger inter-state groupings to manage these new
processes; to guarantee the free flow of resources and
prevent nationalistic or protectionist interruptions;
and to cope with the political and social consequences
of the uneven impact of capitalist accumulation. The
international economic institutions GATT and
Bretton Woods, were relatively successful for the first
30 or so years after the war. But it can be argued that
their success depended on the economic dynamism of
the United States and the stability of the politico-
military framework within which they operated.
Today, no single national economy can exist in
isolation and, hence, the power of any one nation-state
to implement economic policy is much more limited
than orthodox views of the state would suppose.
The socialist countries were only able to pursue self-
reliant strategies by tightly insulating themselves from
the world economy. This also required an appropriate
politico-military framework.
The military alliance system created by the
United States after the war - NATO, CENTO,
SEATO, Anzus, the Rio treaty - provided the
necessary framework for the post-war global
economy. Especially in NATO, military tasks were
collectivised so that no nation-state (except the United
States) enjoyed full military sovereignty - something
that, historically and theoretically, has always been
identified with the power of the nation-state. To
insulate themselves from the West, the socialist
countries created a similar alliance, the Warsaw Pact,
with its own internal military and economic division of
labour.
There were of course differences in the political
relations among alliance countries. The Western
European countries voluntarily abrogated military
sovereignty, by and large, with the consent of the
population. Southern European countries or Eastern
European countries were not given the choice; the
alliance system could be used for direct military
coercion as in Czechoslovakia, 1968, or Poland, 1981,
or Greece, 1967, and Turkey 1980.
Outside the alliance systems, nation-states enjoy more
or less military independence. However, even those
European countries that retain a national responsibility
for territorial defence, e.g. Sweden, Yugoslavia or
Romania, are still dependent on other countries for
military technology and, of course, could never
protect themselves from global war. In the Third
World, military dependence is even greater; the
advanced industrial countries are responsible for
training, supply of weapons and so on. Hence, neither
in military nor economic terms can the nation-state be
described as a separate entity.
The post-war inter-state system was also
characterised by the rise of bureaucratic civilisation in
both economic and military spheres. Both East and
West shared a common technology culture which
seemed to entail huge forms of enterprise, both state
and private, planning and management, fixed
routines, technicity, subservience of science and
R&D, mass communications and the diffusion of
uniform patterns of consumption and production, and
so on. State and corporate institutions seemed to
embrace every facet of civil society, inducing a sense of
individual alienation and of helplessness in the face of
apparently impersonal control over people's lives.
There appears, for example, to be a kind of determinism
in the inexorable 'progress' of military technology and
a fatalism about the possibility of controlling its
bureaucratic foundation, the so-called military-
industrial complex. It can be argued that neither
institutional size nor bureaucratic style is an inevitable
consequence of technology per se; on the contrary,
bureaucratic civilisation may have been responsible
for the modern military and consumer-oriented
technology culture and may inhibit the possibilities for
alternative technologies which could meet material
and spiritual needs more satisfactorily.
The new bureaucratic civilisation became the
guardian of bureaucratic nationalism. Bureaucratic
nationalism has been used by Anthony Smith to term
the new version of the old paradigm created in the 18th
and 19th centuries. But it seems more subtle, harder to
pin down. Why? Bureaucratic nationalism has given
rise to what appear to be abstract ideologies,
attachment to values rather than units. These
ideologies legitimate loyalty to the wider power bloc,
the super alliances; they are a way of managing
people's identification with these new power structures.
The old image of Britain, France and Russia and so on
can produce and reproduce strong emotional
identification. The attachment to 'freedom' (in the
West) or to 'socialism' (in the East) has to be
demonstrated as a more advanced, more progressive
form of loyalty. The wider power blocs appeared, for a
while, to overcome the limitations of the individual
nation-state.
Ultimately all nationalisms are socio-psychological. A
nationalism succeeds when it makes people identify
with distinct territorial boundaries, when it can
produce the 'us' versus 'them' dichotomy. New
bureaucratic nationalism claims to transcend this by
the illusion of freedom within a larger economic or
political unit. But it creates a more dangerous
dichotomy: the 'us' of the West versus the 'them' of the
East or the South and vice versa. This other-image of
people is crucial, for it will ultimately determine
whether the people will obey the signals of war and
stimuli of anxiety emanating from the new bureau-
cratic state system.
In modern history the concept of nation includes the
concept of war (at least the ability to wage war). Today
we remain trapped by both territory and nation butas
members of a nation we belong in fact to a wider
organisation, which guarantees our 'security'.
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The 19th century nationalisms operated in the context
of a system of balance of power, which led to two
world wars and more small ones. Today we call it a
balance of terror and it retains the same components,
except that a state of semi-war, of war preparedness, is
a permanent feature of modern life. Earlier, there were
gaps, the 'temporary armistice called peace' as
Spykman [1970:40] described it, in the cycle of war.
Today, perhaps because the power blocs are larger and
potentially more diverse, the ideological discipline of
pretend war, what we call deterrence, seems to he a
continuous requirement. Indeed, continuous anxiety,
fear of war, could perhaps be said to have
characterised the last 37 years of so-called peace in
Europe, with phases which are more or less war-like
(or peaceful) - Cold War, détente or peaceful co-
existence, the New Cold War.
The New Cold War and the Emergence of
New Social Movements
The New Cold War is the response to new
contradictions that have emerged in the post-war
inter-state system in recent years. These include:
The system seems no longer able to guarantee
continued material accumulation. It can be argued
that the technology culture which developed within
the framework of bureaucratic civilisation reached the
end of its potential around the mid 1960s. Perhaps this
can be explained by the suppression of creativity or,
alternatively, in terms of the limits of military and
consumerist markets, Fordist (assembly line) pro-
duction techniques or excessive use of energy - this is
widely debated in the literature on the current
economic crisis [see, for example, Freeman et al 1982].
Whatever the reasons, the United States lost its
economic dynamism. Growing competition with
Western Europe, Japan and the newly industrialising
countries (NICs), new forms of protectionism such as
high interest rates or voluntary export restrictions
threatened the smooth functioning of the global
economy. The US seemed to be using its superpower
status for traditional nation-state interest. Accumu-
lation also slowed down in the socialist countries and a
loosening of the tight protectionism of socialist
countries, i.e. new forms of East-West economic
cooperation, was thought necessary in order to
overcome this problem.
The credibility of pretend war was challenged by
the experience of actual war. In Vietnam and
Afghanistan, the technological 'superiority' of the
United States and the Soviet Union does not seem able
to bring about victory. Growing consciousness about
the effects of nuclear war called into question the
meaning of deterrence. Particularly in the West, where
cohesion depended on the idea of war and not direct
physical force, people began to ask whether the United
States was a 'protector' or a war risk.
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The ideologies of the two power blocs, which
initially gained strength from the moral capital
acquired by the United States and the Soviet Union in
the defeat of Nazism, are gradually being eroded.
Quite apart from the widespread support for
repressive regimes in the Third World, bureaucratic
civilisation itself, particularly the institutions of
nuclear technology, require a secrecy and elitism that
is in total conflict with popular conceptions of
democracy in the West. In what sense can webe said to
live in a democracy when one or two people have the
power of life or death? When important decisions are
not debated publicly? When large parts of the
economy and policy are protected from public gaze?
In the Soviet case, state-socialism as an economic
system became a mechanism for achieving growth but
also an ideology that legitimïscd war planning.
Centralised economic planning could channel invest-
ment into war production. As Oscar Lange pointed
out, the Soviet economy began to resemble a Western
war economy. The major ideological turning point in
the East was the theoretical shift to the 'socialism in
one country' thesis. Socialism, originally antithetical
to nationalism, has transformed itself in its image for
raisons d'état. The defence of socialism became the
defence of the Soviet Union and preparations for what
E. P. Thompson and others [1982] have called
exterminism are pursued in the name of progressive
humanism. Following this logic there must be
progressive atomic bombs.
The claimed congruence of socialism and peace is thus
also open to question. Can a socialist society rely on a
strategy that entails the threat to annihilate the
working masses in the capitalist world? Can a socialist
society devote ever-increasing resources to destruction
instead of production? Moreover, the phenomena of
war between socialist states or of military coups within
socialist states seems completely antithetical to many
of the claims that are made for socialism.
Finally, the détente period which began in the
early 1970s reduced the effectiveness of the enemy
image, and consequently weakened bloc discipline.
After the devaluation of the dollar in 1971 and the
defeat in Vietnam, the West seemed to need the Soviet
Union for joint global management, while the East
needed to renew contact with the West in order to
overcome the slowdown in accumulation and to ease
the military burden. East-West economic cooperation
was part of the economic strategy of countries like
Poland, the GDR and Hungary. Détente, or peaceful
coexistence, was supposed to preserve the blocs while
reducing the risk of war. But it provided the
opportunity for new movements which challenged the
cold war ideologies. Foremost among these was the
peace movement in the West and Solidarity in the East.
The New Cold War is a way of re-establishing
attachment to the units of the post-war inter-state
system, the power blocs. Reaganism and Thatcherism,
on the one side, and the more outspoken ideological
statements of the new Soviet leaders on the other,
reassert the values of freedom or socialism respectively
and the absolute threat of totalitarianism or
imperialism. New doctrines of nuclear and con-
ventional war fighting, ambitious military exercises
and so on, recreate the immediacy of war.
Alongside the New Cold War is the re-emergence of
more traditional nationalism. British jingoism, for
example, justifies new forms of interventionism in
former colonies and we can observe a similar
phenomenon in France. In Eastern Europe, the
reassertion of national identity - Polishness,
Hungarianness and so on - provides a vehicle for
expressing autonomy from the wider power bloc
whilst the wider bloc attempts to reassert higher over-
all control. The partly complementary, partly
contradictory relationship between the old and the
new nationalisms is situated in the global processes of
integration and distintegration stemming from uneven
economic development, transnationalisation, the
slowdown of accumulation in advanced industrial
countries. All nationalisms share the common
characteristic of being able to attribute praise or blame
to whole sets of people or systems for these turbulent
processes. In the past, reward and retribution has
legitimated war. No nationalism can come to terms
with the awful present-day consequences of this simple
universalism.
By the same token, however, nationalism, especially
the New Cold War, has lost much of its divisive power.
The very systemic contradictions which gave rise to
the New Cold War are also a reason for disillusion.
This is why the anti-systemic movements which
challenge the logic of the Cold War are becoming
important. They represent a growing struggle against
the system as a whole in ways that can not fit into any
of the standard ideological boxes. The most important
feature of their ideological thrust has been an implicit
(and sometimes explicit) rejection of the primacy of
the existing ideological divisions. The common origin
of these grassroot movements is the New Left and the
counter-culture of the 1960s, which was followed later
by the Greens, the women's movement, the
movements for decentralisation and other single issue
campaigns. Today in Western Europe the alternative
is represented by the Peace Movement newly
organised in the late l970s.
One of the most significant achievements of the new
West European peace movement is that it has been
able to cross national boundaries. A new development
is the widespread perception that peace movements
are possible in grassroot forms in Eastern Europe as
well, and that bridges must be built between the
autonomous movements of East and West.
In Eastern Europe, Poland's Solidarity movement has
been the most powerful grassroot anti-systemic
movement since the Second World War. The constant
efforts of Solidarity to pursue its goals without seeking
integration into the state aparatus was not only a
tactic; it was also an expression of the fear of
'cooptation' - which represented a variant of 1960s
New Left thinking. What these two types of grassroots
antisystemic movements share is an entirely original
conception of state power; a realisation that state
power is not limitless and that real political power is
widely diffused and not located only in state
structures. Because states are embedded in the inter-
state system and the interdependent global economy,
their autonomy is limited. They can not be treated as
separate entities. The aim is not to capture state
power, for a radical social movement would find it just
as difficult as current political parties to escape the
rules and constraints of the current inter-state system.
Rather, the aim is to redefine the relationship between
states and between the state and civil society, to
change the circumstances of power. Anti-systemic
movements win when their ideas are implemented, not
when their people form a government.
Breaking with the logic of the Newtonian world view,
going beyond the concept of the nation or even the
wider power bloc as a separate, all-powerful unit, is
perhaps the only opportunity for movements of East
and West, and even the Third World, to find an
alternative to deterrence and the Cold War, and to
move towards a set of social relations that can match
the research of humankind's technological discoveries.
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